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This paper analyzes the extent of risk-sharing among stockholders and among non-
stockholders. Wealthy households play a crucial role in many economic problems due
to the substantial concentration of asset holdings in the U.S. data. Hence, to evalu-
ate the empirical importance of market incompleteness, it is essential to determine if
idiosyncratic shocks are important for the wealthy, who have access to better insurance
opportunities, but also face diﬀerent risks, than the average household. We study a
model where each period households decide whether to participate in the stock market
by paying a ﬁxed cost. Due to this endogenous entry decision, the testable implications
of perfect risk-sharing take the form of a sample selection model, which we estimate
and test using a semi-parametric GMM estimator proposed by Kyriazidou (2001). Us-
ing data from PSID we strongly reject perfect risk-sharing among stockholders, but
perhaps surprisingly, do not ﬁnd evidence against it among non-stockholders. These
results appear to be robust to several extensions we considered. These ﬁndings indi-
cate that market incompleteness may be more important for the wealthy, and suggest
further focus on risk factors that primarily aﬀect this group, such as entrepreneurial
income risk.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
In the past several years, models with incomplete markets and uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks
have achieved a central place in many ﬁelds of economics. These models are now used to study a
wide range of economic questions, such as business cycle dynamics, ﬁscal policy, wealth inequality,
asset prices, among many others (c.f., Aiyagari (1994); Constantinides and Duﬃe (1996); Krusell
and Smith (1998); Heaton and Lucas (2000); Storesletten, et. al (2001)).
A major motivation for these studies has been the decisive empirical rejection of perfect risk-
sharing–the hypothesis that individuals are able to insure against all idiosyncratic shocks, and
consequently, that their marginal utilities move in lockstep with each other. A number of em-
pirical studies have found individuals’ marginal utility growth (sometimes proxied by consumption
growth) to be correlated with certain idiosyncratic shocks, violating the premise of perfect insurance
(Cochrane (1991); Nelson (1994); Townsend (1994); and Attanasio and Davis (1996)).
An important point to note is that these studies test if perfect risk sharing (PRS) holds among
all households in the population. However, given that asset holdings and wealth are extremely
concentrated–basically 90 percent of non-housing wealth and 98 percent of stocks is held by the
top 20 percent of the U.S. population–wealthy households play a crucial role in many economic
interactions.1 Thus, for a satisfactory analysis of the issues mentioned above, it is especially im-
portant to determine the extent of risk-sharing among these wealthy households.
On the one hand, there are good reasons to suspect that wealthy households stand a better
chance of achieving perfect risk-sharing than the rest of the population. These households almost
exclusively trade in stock markets, and therefore have access to the arguably most sophisticated
market-based risk sharing mechanism. Thus, it seems possible that the empirical rejection of PRS
among all households could be driven by the lack of insurance among the poor, and may not provide
aj u s t i ﬁcation that idiosyncratic risk is important for the wealthy. But, on the other hand, wealthy
households are exposed to certain risks to a much larger extent than the rest of the population. For
example, private capital–which is roughly as large as the capital in publicly traded companies, and
is potentially diﬃcult to insure due to asymmetric information problems–is concentrated among the
wealthy, exposing them to entrepreneurial income risk not faced by other households.2 Furthermore,
investors in ﬁnancial markets face several trading frictions (such as transactions costs, margin
requirements, costs of information acquisition, etc.) which could prevent optimal diversiﬁcation
and expose stockholders to the idiosyncratic risk of the stocks in their portfolio. The ﬁrst goal of
this paper is then to formally investigate if the (wealthy) stockholders–who face these various risks
1See Guvenen (2005a) for empirical evidence on the inequality of wealth and asset holdings in the U.S. Because
households in the top 20 percent own almost all stocks outstanding as well as 90 percent of the wealth, we also refer
to stockholders as “the wealthy,” and to non-stockholders as “the poor.”
2Gentry and Hubbard (1998), and Heaton and Lucas (2000) document the extreme concentration of private capital
and the business risks faced by entrepreneurs.
2and have access to various risk sharing mechanisms–are able to share risk eﬀectively.
As emphasized in the literature, however, trading in ﬁnancial assets is not the only channel for
risk sharing. There are a number of informal (or non-market) insurance mechanisms available to
most households, such as redistributive government and social programs, gifts and loans between
family members, ﬁnancial assistance provided by charities, long-term contracts and labor hoarding
by companies, and so on. Given also that the less wealthy households (non-stockholders) may not
be exposed to certain types of risks as noted above, it is conceivable that they could also be sharing
risk eﬀectively among themselves. To investigate this possibility then, we also test for perfect risk
sharing among the less wealthy (non-stockholders). Applying the test of PRS to this latter group
also has the advantage of providing a benchmark to compare the results for stockholders.
We consider an economy with a complete set of ﬁnancial assets traded in a stock market. Thus
all shocks are potentially insurable. Each period households decide whether to participate in the
stock market by paying a per-period participation cost, or to stay out and trade a single risk-free
asset. Households also make optimal portfolio and labor supply decisions. In addition, since perfect
risk sharing imposes restrictions on marginal utilities, a suﬃciently ﬂexible parameterization of the
utility function is crucial for our purposes. To this end, we allow for non-separabilities between
consumption and the leisure times of head and spouse, and incorporate household-speciﬁc preference
shifters. This speciﬁcation is more general than most of those adopted in previous studies (with the
exception of Altug and Miller (1990) and Hayashi, Altonji and Kotlikoﬀ (1996) which are similar
to ours).
Due to the endogenous nature of stock market participation in this model, the testable impli-
cations of the risk-sharing hypothesis for stockholders take the form of a sample selection model,
where the participation decision serves as the selection equation. To eliminate the selection bias,
we implement a semiparametric GMM estimator recently proposed by Kyriazidou (1997, 2001) for
panel data models, which does not require strong distributional assumptions about the error terms.
To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst implementation of this estimator.
Our ﬁndings can be summarized as follows. Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynam-
ics (PSID) we strongly reject perfect risk-sharing among stockholders, but perhaps surprisingly, do
not ﬁnd similar evidence against it among non-stockholders. This result is robust to several ex-
tensions we considered, such as including future wages into the instrument set (as advocated by
Hayashi et. al (1996)), and using diﬀerent moment conditions implied by PRS, among others. To
interpret this ﬁnding, it would seem hard to argue that non-stockholders have access to better risk
sharing opportunities than stockholders, suggesting that the diﬀerence (in the tests of PRS) is likely
to be due to the additional uninsurable risks faced by stockholders. Finally, we also strongly reject
PRS for the whole population consistent with the existing literature, suggesting that those earlier
rejections could also be driven by the lack of risk sharing among wealthy households.
3These results have important implications for modeling choices made in heterogenous-agent
models regarding the types of uninsurable risks. For example, the most common sources of un-
certainty in these models are labor income risk, unemployment risk, health shocks, and mortality
r i s k . H o w e v e r ,i ti sa l s oc o m m o nt oa s s u m et h a td i ﬀerent groups in the population–such as the
wealthy and the poor–are exposed to these uninsurable risks to similar extents, which is hard
to reconcile with our ﬁndings.3 In contrast, some recent studies have begun incorporating entre-
preneurial income risk–a risk that primarily aﬀects the wealthy–into incomplete markets models
(c.f., Angeletos (2005); Cagetti and De Nardi (2004); Chari, Golosov and Tsyvinski (2002)). Our
results support this emphasis and suggest further focus on risks that fall disproportionately on the
wealthy.
In terms of approach this paper is most closely related to the literature which test for PRS among
smaller groups in the population. The discouraging rejection of PRS in the whole population by
the studies mentioned above led researchers to focus on smaller economic units who have strong
ties with the hope of uncovering full insurance within these groups. Examples include households
living in the same geographical regions (Hess and Shin, 2000), inhabitants of small villages in
various underdeveloped countries (Townsend (1994); and Ogaki and Zhang (2001)), and ﬁnally,
family members (Hayashi, Altonji and Kotlikoﬀ (1996)). However, these studies treat participation
in these groups as exogenous, and hence do not address selection bias.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we set up the model and derive the
testable implications of PRS. In Section 3 we develop the econometric techniques to analyze this
problem in the presence of selection bias. Then in Section 4 we describe the data, and discuss the
estimation of the selection equation. Section 5 presents the results and discusses robustness. We
then discuss some potential explanations for the ﬁndings, and conclude in Section 6.
2 The Model
There are a ﬁnite number of households, each with a life span of T periods. Households derive
utility from consumption as well as from husband’s and spouse’s leisure times. Speciﬁcally, the








3See, for example, Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes (1994) and Carroll and Samwick (1997), who estimate very
similar labor income processes for diﬀerent education groups in the population. These estimates are extensively
used to calibrate heterogeneous-agent models. Unemployment risk is sometimes assumed to vary across demographic
groups consistent with empirical evidence (high skill workers have lower unemployment rate). But this assumption
implies more risks for the poor in these models, in contrast to our results.
4where β is the subjective time discount rate; Cit is consumption in period t; L1it and L2it are the
leisure times of head and spouse respectively in period t, and Xit is a vector of household-speciﬁc
preference shifters that captures all the heterogeneity across households relevant for preferences.4
The period utility function, u, is continuously diﬀerentiable and concave in the choice variables for
each value of Xit.
Financial Markets and Participation
Let st denote a date-event pair (state), which constitutes a complete description of uncertainty
for all the economy that is realized in t, and let st =( s1,s 2,...,s t) be the history of states realized
up through period t. For example, st will contain the realization of wages of all households, the
return on all assets in the economy in period t,e t c .E a c hn o d est branches out into S possible states
(successor nodes) in the next period. There is a complete set (S) of Arrow securities (one-period
contingent claims) available in every state, each paying one unit of consumption good in exactly
one state of the world tomorrow. From this description, it is clear that all shocks are potentially
insurable.
In addition, there is also a risk-free bond available in the economy. While this bond can be
traded freely by all households (that is, without incurring any ﬁxed or proportional transaction
costs), the same does not hold for the Arrow securities. Households must pay a ﬁxed cost of ΨP in
every period they participate in ﬁnancial markets (which we will also refer to as the “stock market”)
where these securities are traded.5
To better understand the choices facing a typical household, it is useful to express the decision
problem recursively. Each period a household decides whether to participate in the stock market in
the current period by paying ΨP, or to stay outside and trade the risk-free bond only. Deﬁne q(s)
to be the (1 × S) price vector of the Arrow securities when the current state is s,a n dq0 to be the
bond price. Similarly, let the (S × 1) vector ki ≡ (k1i,k 2i,...,k Si) denote a current stockholder’s
portfolio choice vector of Arrow securities, and k0i be the bond holdings of a non-stockholder. We






4Throughout the paper bold letters are used to denote vectors in order to distinguish them from scalars.
5This per-period fee is intended to capture several explicit and implicit costs of trading in ﬁnancial markets,
such as the time and eﬀort it takes to monitor and rebalance one’s portfolio, the additional time it takes to ﬁle tax
returns, etc. Vissing-Jorgensen (2000) estimates these costs from micro data and concludes that even modest ﬁxed
costs (about $150 per year) are suﬃcient to keep a large fraction of households out of the stock market. However,
it seems plausible that certain types of participation costs, (especially those associated with learning how ﬁnancial
markets work, etc.) are incurred only once. This would suggest that there could be a one-time ﬁxed cost as well
as a per-period ﬁxed cost. In the working paper version (Guvenen 2003) we allowed for both of these costs. This
extension made the participation decision dynamic (and the model more complicated), but had no substantive eﬀect
on our results. Thus, we abstract from the one-time cost in the current version.
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where υh and υn are the value functions of current stockholders and non-stockholders respectively;
W1i (s), and W2i (s) denote the wages of the head and the spouse respectively after history s,a n d
ωi denotes ﬁnancial wealth. Finally, although the arguments of the choice variables are suppressed
for clarity of notation, they are all functions of the state vector (ωi,Xi;s).
Note the diﬀerence between the budget constraints of current stockholders and non-stockholders.
In particular, stockholders choose an unrestricted (S × 1) portfolio vector implying that they can
transfer any (budget-feasible) amount of wealth to a given state in the next period. Thus markets
are dynamically complete within the stock market community. In contrast, non-stockholders are
restricted to choosing a constant wealth level, k0, for the next period.
2.1 Perfect risk-sharing
In the model presented above households optimally enter and exit the stock market in diﬀerent
periods, and thus face complete markets and incomplete markets at diﬀerent points in time. This
is in contrast to the canonical model used to test for PRS in the previous literature where (under
the null hypothesis) households face complete markets every period. Despite this diﬀerence, the
main testable implication of PRS derived in the canonical model continues to hold in our model,
but only for households who participate in the stock market in two consecutive periods.6 For clarity
of exposition then, we present the derivation of the PRS condition in the canonical model, which
can be obtained from our general framework by simply setting ΨP ≡ 0.
6As shown below, precisely because the PRS condition holds for households who self-select into the stock market,
PRS must be tested jointly with the selection equation.
6In this case, without the participation cost, a household faces complete markets in every period,











where βtλ(st) is the time-zero price of one unit of consumption in state st. This budget constraint
equates the discounted lifetime value of expenditures to the discounted lifetime value of wage
income. Let φi be the multiplier associated with constraint (2). The ﬁrst order condition for
consumption choice is given by
1
φi
u1 (Cit,L 1it,L 2it,Xit)=λt. (3)
where the subscript of u denotes the partial derivative with respect to the indicated argument.
Similarly, the labor supply decision of the head (assuming an interior solution) is determined by:7
1
φi
u2(Cit,L 1it,L 2it,Xit)=λtW1it. (4)
Taking the ratio of (3) for periods t−1 and t to eliminate the unobservable component, φi,w e
get
u1 (Cit,L 1it,L 2it,Xit)





This last equation clearly illustrates the main implication of PRS: the marginal utility growth
of a given household (on the left hand side) should only be a function of aggregate variables (the
right hand side), and hence, should not be correlated with any idiosyncratic variable. In contrast,
with incomplete markets, there is no reason to expect marginal utility growth to be equated across
households. The main test of PRS is then to estimate the relationship in (5) and then see if any
idiosyncratic variable is correlated with the resulting error term. Because of the stock market
participation decision in our framework, the PRS condition holds for households who are in the
s t o c km a r k e ti np e r i o d st − 1 and t.8 Consequently, this self-selection must be taken into account
when testing condition (5).
2.2 The participation decision
In general a closed form solution for the participation decision is not available, although it is easy
to see that a numerical solution can be obtained by solving backwards starting from the last period
7A condition analogous to (4) holds for the female labor supply decision, although we do not use it in our analysis.
8See the working paper version (Guvenen 2003, Appendix A), which shows that equation (5) indeed holds for the
present model with Ψ
P > 0.
7of a household’s life. The focus of this paper is on risk-sharing, and our interest in the participation
decision is mainly for having a good speciﬁcation of the characteristics of households who self-select
into the stock market. Thus, rather than explicitly solve for the participation decision, we seek
variables that determine this choice, which can be obtained from the optimization problem above.





if the reverse holds, implying that the decision rule will be a function of the the state vector:
¡
ωit,Xit;st¢
. Although in general st is a high-dimensional vector containing the entire history of
asset prices and wages in the economy, it can be simpliﬁed substantially by making two observations.
First, the eﬃcient markets hypothesis holds that asset returns are not predictable. Although there
is some evidence of predictability of stock returns over long horizons, at shorter horizons (one to
two years) stock returns are diﬃcult to predict (see Guvenen (2005b, table 4)). Consistent with
this evidence, we assume that asset returns are i.i.d over time, implying that that the history of
asset prices can be excluded from s. Second, there is substantial empirical evidence indicating that
the persistence in individual wage dynamics can be adequately represented by an AR(1) process
(which includes a random walk as a special case. See Browning, Hansen and Heckman (1999) for
a detailed review of this evidence). This implies that the current wage (W1it,W 2it) is a suﬃcient
state variable for predicting the future evolution of a household’s wage process. Putting these two
pieces together, we obtain s =( W1it,W 2it).
To sum up, the participation decision rule for a typical agent can be written as
dit =1{π(ωit,W 1it,W 2it,Xit) ≥ 0},
where 1{·} is an indicator function, and π(·) is determined by the solution to the problem.9 Clearly,
the set of variables included in π(·) represent all the potential determinants of stockholding, and it
is likely that empirically only a subset of them are signiﬁcant factors in participation choice. For
example, variables which aﬀect υh and υn symmetrically will leave υh − υn unchanged and will
have no impact on participation. Thus, identifying the signiﬁcant determinants of stockholding is
ultimately an empirical question, which we address in Section 4.2.
2.3 Empirical Speciﬁcation
Since perfect risk-sharing imposes restrictions on marginal utilities, the speciﬁcation of the utility
function is especially important for the purposes of this paper. Following Altug and Miller (1990)
9Notice that other parameters of the model (including Ψ
P, ρ0, etc.) will also play a role in the participation
choice. But these parameters are assumed to be identical across the population–except those already summarized
in Xit–so they are all soaked up into the functional form of π.
8we assume the following period utility function







This speciﬁcation is quite ﬂexible, and indeed, it is more general than most of those considered in
the previous literature. One limitation of the PSID consumption data that we use in our empirical
work is that it consists of only food expenditures. We thus interpret the speciﬁcation in (6) as the
ﬁrst two sub-utilities of a more general utility function in which non-food consumption enters in a
separable manner. (This has been the maintained assumption in all previous studies using PSID.
See Section 4.1 for further discussion). Then the ﬁrst sub-utility can be interpreted as a Cobb-
Douglas home-production function where food expenditures serves as capital and female leisure
hours as labor input.
The second sub-utility captures the possible non-separability between the leisure times of head
and spouse. Non-separable speciﬁcations in both sub-utilities have empirical support (Browning
and Meghir (1991), Altug and Miller (1990)). Another possibility is to have male leisure also enter
the ﬁrst sub-utility. But ﬁrst, Hayashi et al. (1996) test for this possibility and do not ﬁnd support
for it. Second, if in fact male leisure and consumption are non-separable, tests based on equation
(5) are invalid due to observational equivalence (See Attanasio and Davis (1996, page 1235) for a
discussion of this point).
Some components of the vector Xit may not be observable to the econometrician. Hence, it is
convenient to write Xit =( xit,ε 0i,ε 1i,ε 0it,ε 1it), where xit is a vector representing the observable
component, and the remaining elements denote the unobservables. Each sub-utility is weighted by
indices which are log-linear functions of Xit:
δm(Xit)=ρ−1
m exp(bmxit + εmi + εmit),m =0 ,1. (7)
Here bm is a ﬁxed vector of coeﬃcients; εmi represents the ﬁxed household-eﬀect, and εmit
is a zero-mean disturbance term which varies both over time and across households. Further
assumptions on the error terms will be stated in the next section. Note that each subutility is
scaled by ρ0 and ρ1.
For tractability, we specialize the selection function π(·) to a linear form, which allows us to
write the decision rule as a standard binary choice equation. Substituting the observable and
unobservable parts of Xit, we obtain
dit =1 {θyit + ηi − ηit ≥ 0}, (8)
where θ is a ﬁxed vector of coeﬃcients; yit ≡ (ωit,W 1it,W 2it,xit); ηi ≡ ε0i + ε1i, and ηit ≡
−(ε0it + ε1it).
92.4 Moment Conditions
Using the parameterization for preferences, the risk-sharing condition for stockholders (5) yields
our ﬁrst moment condition. After taking logarithms, ﬁrst diﬀerencing, and rearranging, we obtain
(ρ0 − 1)∆cit = ∆ln(λt) − b0∆xit − ρ2∆l2it + ∆ε0it, (9)
where ∆t denotes the diﬀerence operator between t and t − 1, and lower-case letters denote the
natural logarithms of their upper-case counterparts (except for xit).
Although this equation by itself is suﬃcient to test for risk-sharing, it cannot identify all the
structural parameters of the model. For that purpose, we add another moment condition which is
valid for both the stockholders and the non-stockholders. Using equations (3) and (4), we get
u2 (Cit,L 1it,L 2it,Xit)
u1 (Cit,L 1it,L 2it,Xit)
= W1it. (10)
This is the familiar intra-temporal eﬃciency condition equating the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and leisure to the wage rate.10 Notice that this is a static condition, which
does not depend on market completeness, so it holds for non-stockholders as well. It is convenient
to take logarithms, then diﬀerence (10) to obtain:
(ρ0 − 1)∆cit = −∆w1it +( b1 − b0)∆xit − (ρ2 − ρ3)∆l2it +( ρ1 − 1)∆l1it +( ∆ε1it − ∆ε0it). (11)
3 Econometric Method
Since the disturbance terms, ∆ε0it and (∆ε1it − ∆ε0it), i nt h ee q u a t i o n sa b o v eh a v ez e r om e a nb y
construction, it might seem reasonable to look at (9) and (11) as deﬁning orthogonality conditions,
which could then be estimated using GMM. However, this strategy is not directly applicable in this
framework due to sample selection bias. To clearly see this, ﬁrst consider the PRS condition (9).
Under the null hypothesis, only stockholders are able to share risk perfectly, so the appropriate
moment condition is:
E [∆ε0it | ditdi,t−1 =1 ]=0 , (12)
10Notice that the MRS equation holds as an equality only when the head is working in a given period, which can
potentially cause another selection problem. Altug and Miller (1990) estimate a Tobit speciﬁcation for selection into
the labor market and ﬁn dt h a tt h ee r r o rt e r mi nt h es e l e c t i o ne q u a t i o nh a sas m a l la n di n s i g n i ﬁcant correlation with
t h ee r r o ri nt h eM R Se q u a t i o n . M o r e o v e r ,w ee l i m i n a t ef a rfewer households compared to these authors, since we
only require the head to work for two consecutive years to be included in the estimation (whereas they require this
for 14 consecutive years), so this problem is probably even less critical in this case.
10which requires
E [ε0it | dit =1 ] = E [ε0it−1 | di,t−1 =1 ]⇒
E [ε0it | ηit ≤ θyit + ηi]=E
£
ε0it−1 | ηit−1 ≤ θyit−1 + ηi
¤
(13)
to hold. In general both sides of this equation will be non-zero, because ε0it is correlated with
ηit, which we earlier deﬁned as −(ε0it + ε1it). In other words, the unobservable preference shock
that aﬀects the risk-sharing condition, ε0it, also inﬂuences the stock market participation decision,
creating a selection bias. Furthermore, while it is possible that these conditional expectations are
non-zero, but still equal to each other, this is not likely to be the case either given that these
expectations are functions of θyit, and will vary over time as this selection index changes.
This last observation, however, suggests a way of eliminating the selection bias, and forms the
basis of the estimator proposed by Kyriazidou (1997, 2001). To explain the basic idea of this
estimator, we ﬁrst make two assumptions.
Let Zit be a vector of instruments.
Assumption A1. {(ε0it,ε 1it)}T
t=1 is i.i.d over time for all i, conditional on ζi ≡ {ηi, Zi0,
(yi1,...,yiT)}.
Assumption A2. (ε0it,ε 1it) is independent of Ziτ for all τ<t , and for all i conditional on ζi.
The ﬁrst assumption is the same as condition (A10) in Kyriazidou (2001). An important impli-
cation of this assumption is that all regressors in the selection equation must be exogenous. The
second assumption is a slight weakening of her assumption (A20) that allows us to have endogenous
variables in the main equation and to instrument for them using lagged dependent variables.11
Because ηit is the sum of ε0it and ε1it, it also satisﬁes both assumptions above.
The idea behind Kyriazidou’s estimator can be explained as follows. From the discussion above,
it is clear that the term E [ε0it | ηit ≤ θyit + ηi] will remain unchanged if the selection index,
θyit, (and consequently the conditioning set) is constant in two consecutive periods. Thus, under
assumptions A1 and A2, the following modiﬁed version of condition (12) holds:
E [∆ε0it | ditdi,t−1 =1 , ∆θyit =0 ]=0 . (14)





m a yb ev e r ys m a l l ,o re v e ne m p t y .O n es t r a t e g yi st h e n
to assign a weight to each observation which is inversely proportional to the change in the index
11This is the only diﬀerence between Kyriazidou (2001)’s original estimator and the one used here. Kyriazidou
considers the case where all regressors in the main equation are either strictly exogenous or lagged endogenous
variables. Instead in our case, consumption and leisure are likely to correlated with contemporaneous preference
shocks, and so we intrument for these variables. Assumption A2 ensures that such instruments exists. Furthermore,
there are a number of additional regularity assumptions that are required for the estimator discussed in Appendix B.
11of that household, ∆θyit, such that asymptotically only observations with constant indices are
included in the estimation.12
The estimator can then be implemented as follows. In the ﬁrst step, the selection equation (8)
is estimated to obtain an estimate of θ (denoted by b θ). Then, using this estimate we construct











where K (·) is a scalar density function which satisﬁes certain regularity conditions (described in
Appendix B), and hN is a sequence of “bandwidths” which tends to zero as the sample size N →∞ .
For a ﬁxed value of ∆b θyit the weight ψN
it shrinks as N increases, while for ﬁxed N,al a r g e rd e v i a t i o n
in the selection index corresponds to a smaller weight.
The kernel-weighted GMM estimator is constructed as follows. Let f (α) denote a column vector
of orthogonality conditions, f(α,i) be its sample counterpart for the ith observation, and α be the
vector of identiﬁable parameters in that system. For example, f(α) could be obtained by interacting
∆ε0it in equation (14) with some appropriate instruments from the set Zit. The key diﬀerence
from a standard GMM estimator is in the construction of the sample counterparts of the moment





Once GN (α) is obtained, we proceed as in the case of a standard GMM estimation:







where ΦN be a stochastic matrix that converges in probability to a ﬁnite non-stochastic limit
Φ0, and the superscript ‘T’ denotes the transpose of a matrix. This estimator is consistent and
asymptotically normal with
√
NhN convergence rate (Kyriazidou, 2001). Further details of the
estimation method are contained in Appendix B.
12It is clear that the same approach can be used to correct for the selection bias among non-stockholders, which
we do when testing for PRS among this group. In addition, a similar selection problem also exists in the estimation
of the MRS condition (11) because our sample selection procedure described in next section eliminates households
who change their stockholding status during the sample period: dit 6= di,t−1. Even though this moment condition
holds for the whole population unlike the PRS condition, the error term (∆ε1it − ∆ε0it) has zero mean over the entire
population, whereas we need this expectation to be zero over the sample that we observe: dit = di,t−1
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4.1 The PSID data
This section brieﬂy describes the data and the variables used in the empirical analysis. Further
details are provided in Appendix A. The data are drawn from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID) covering the period from 1982 to 1993. Although PSID data is available from 1968 onwards,
data on stock ownership was not collected until 1984, making the earlier period unsuitable for our
purposes. (Data from 1982-83 is used for constructing instruments.) The availability of income
and consumption data13, along with detailed demographic information has made PSID attractive
for studying perfect risk-sharing, and not surprisingly it has been used extensively for this purpose
in the previous literature (among others, Altug and Miller (1990); Cochrane (1991); Hayashi, et al.
(1996); and Hess and Shin (2000)). To the extent possible, we follow these studies in our sample
selection criteria.
We use households from the core sample of PSID, which is a representative sample of U.S.
households. In addition, we select a family into the sample in year t if the head: (i) was in the
study for four consecutive years including 1984 or 1989; (ii) was married to the same spouse in t
and t−1; and (iii) had positive labor hours in t and t−1. We further eliminate households who had
missing or inconsistent data on some key variables as described in Appendix A. Filtering out these
observations leaves a total of 8941 household-years (observations) that can be used in estimation.
For each household i ∈ {1,...,N} we have data on (a) annual leisure hours of head and spouse;
(b) real average hourly earnings of head and spouse; (c) age of head and spouse, denoted age1it and
age2it respectively; (d) real household food consumption expenditures (which is the sum of “food
at home,” “food away from home,” and “the cash value of food stamps”); (e) number of household
members, hszit (f) completed education of head, Eit (g) a dummy indicating whether the household
is a stockholder, dit. These variables are available in every year from 1982 to 1993, except for food
data which is missing in 1988 and 1989, and stockholding variable which is only available in 1984
and 1989.
Table 1 provides the summary statistics of the data for both groups. First, note that there are
roughly twice as many non-stockholders as there are stockholders in our sample (65 percent versus
35 percent). This point is important to keep in mind when interpreting the relative power of the
tests of PRS in the two subsamples. Second, the average annual work hours, both for males and
females, are similar across the two groups. Third, the average hourly earnings of stockholders is
higher–by 70 percent for males, and by 50 percent for females–than that of non-stockholders.
And fourth, the average food consumption is 18 percent higher for stockholders. However, despite
13Although consumption data is restricted to food and a few other expenditure items. We discuss this limitation
below.
13Table 1: A List of Key Variables and Their Simple Statistics
Stockholders Non-stockholders All
(i) Number of Observations 3178 5763 8941
(ii) Percentage of sample 34.8% 65.2% 100%
Hours and Earnings
(i)Average annual 2213 2177 2189
hours of husband (646.1) (686.5) (672.1)
(ii)Average annual 1451 1501 1483
hours of spouse (741.5) (706.8) (718.2)
(iii)Average hourly $17.83 $10.41 $12.99
earnings of husband (13.79) (7.45) (9.76)
(iv)Average hourly $10.10 $6.82 $7.96
earnings of spouse (9.08) (5.71) (6.88)
(v)Average annual $5249 $4419 $4708
Food consumption (2806) (2253) (2445)
Demographic Variables
(i)Average age of 43.8 39.9 41.2
husband (11.3) (11.4) (11.3)
(ii)Average Education 6.07 4.9 5.31
of Head (1.54) (1.62) (1.59)
(iii)Average household 3.3 3.6 3.5
size (1.13) (1.21) (1.18)
Note: Standard deviations are in parenthesis. The sample selection criteria are detailed in Appendix A.
these diﬀerences in levels, there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the dispersion of any of these
variables across the two groups: the coeﬃcient of variations of hours, earnings and consumption
are similar for stockholders and non-stockholders.
Finally, there are a few points concerning the use of food expenditures as the measure of con-
sumption that should be addressed. First, separability between food and non-food has been the
maintained assumption in all studies on risk-sharing using PSID data, which makes our results com-
parable (Altug and Miller (1990); Cochrane (1991); Hayashi, et. al. (1996); Hess and Shin (2000),
etc.). Second, Atkeson and Ogaki (1996) provide evidence that food and non-food consumption
are separable.14 Moreover, Ogaki and Zhang (2001) ﬁnd virtually the same results regarding PRS
when they replicate their tests using non-durable consumption instead of food expenditures. Third,
a possible concern could be that food consumption may not be suﬃciently variable causing risk-
sharing tests to have low power. But, if anything, the volatility of food consumption (from PSID)
is higher than the volatility of non-durables consumption calculated from the Consumption Ex-
14See also, however, Attanasio and Browing (1995) who argue against separability between food and non-food
consumption.
14penditure Survey. This is true for both stockholders and non-stockholders. Finally, in section 5.2
we derive and test another implication of the perfect risk sharing hypothesis that does not rely on
consumption data. As we further discuss there, the results of that test conﬁrm our ﬁndings using
food expenditures.
4.2 First step: The selection equation
The ﬁrst step in the procedure is to estimate the parameter vector θ in the participation equation.
This question has received a lot of attention in the recent literature, and as a result, there now exists
a wealth of information on the empirical determinants of stock market participation (c.f., Haliassos
and Bertaut (1995), Hurst et al. (1998), Vissing-Jorgensen (2000), Guiso et al. (2001), Curcuru et
a. (2005)). Many of these papers use data sets containing detailed wealth and portfolio information,
such as the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), that are more suitable for this estimation than
the PSID. Given this existing body of work, we do not re-estimate the selection equation in this
paper. Rather, we construct the kernel weights based on the ﬁndings of this literature, which we
discuss here.
In an early paper Haliassos and Bertaut (1995) estimate a logit model for stockholding choice
using data from the SCF with a large number of explanatory variables that include demographics,
preferences towards risk, income, wealth and occupation. In particular, their list of variables
contains all the variables included in our speciﬁcation of the selection equation (8), except that they
use labor income instead of wages. They ﬁnd (1) race, (2) education, (3) risk aversion measures, (4)
labor income, (5) ﬁnancial net worth, and (6) “whether the individual has a managerial occupation,”
to be signiﬁcant determinants of stockholding. Subsequent studies mentioned above have conﬁrmed
these ﬁndings using various alternative speciﬁcations and diﬀerent data sets.
An important point to observe about these ﬁndings is that except for labor income and ﬁnancial
wealth, these explanatory variables represent individual (or household) characteristics that show
little or no change over time. Since kernel weights are constructed based on the time change in
the selection index, all but two of these regressors become redundant. Consequently, the coeﬃcient
estimates on these ﬁxed characteristics do not aﬀect the second step estimation, as they are always
diﬀerenced out.
The conclusion we draw from this analysis is that, in order to correct for the selectivity bias, we
need to mainly consider movements over time in labor income and ﬁnancial wealth. Nevertheless,
labor income and ﬁnancial wealth are both endogenous variabl e sa n da r et h u sl i k e l yt ob ec o r r e l a t e d
with the preference shifters included in the main equation (e.g., the MRS and PRS conditions),
which is not allowed by Assumption A1 above. In our work then, we proxy for both variables with
the sum of the head’s wage and spouse’s wage, W1it +W2it, and construct a univariate kernel with
this variable only (see Guvenen (2003) for further justiﬁcations for using this proxy.)
154.3 Second step: The main equation
There are a number of diﬀerent ways the risk-sharing hypothesis can be tested. The ﬁrst and
most obvious one is to estimate (9) alone for stockholders and use Hansen’s J − test as a model
speciﬁcation test. If stockholders are not able to share risk perfectly, then their marginal utility
growth cannot be explained by aggregate shocks alone, and the residuals will be correlated with
idiosyncratic variables. By including household-level variables in the instrument set this correlation
will be caught by the J−test as a model speciﬁcation error. This idea forms the basis of the previous
tests implemented in the literature.
A second method, whose advantage will become clear in a moment, is the following: First esti-
mate the MRS condition (11), which holds for the entire population. Then append (9) multiplied
by dit as an additional moment condition and estimate the two jointly, and test for PRS as an
overidentifying restriction of the model. Speciﬁcally, if the additional orthogonality condition im-
poses p1 extra restrictions and identiﬁes p2 additional parameters (and p1 >p 2)t h e nNhN (eﬀective
sample size) times the increment in the GMM criterion function has a χ2 distribution with (p1−p2)
degrees of freedom. The second approach has the advantage of exploiting more information thereby
increasing the eﬃciency of the estimator and the power of our hypothesis test. We will report the
results using both approaches.
The choice of optimal bandwidth.–A standard Gaussian density is used for the kernel function
K (·). As noted by Kyriazidou (2001), the choice of bandwidth is potentially more important for
the performance of the estimator than the choice of kernel. The optimal bandwidth is determined
with a cross-validation procedure described in appendix xx. This procedure yields an optimal
bandwidth of h∗
N =0 .24. However, the cross-validation criterion function is quite ﬂat between 0.2
to 0.5, although it increases steeply outside this region. Due to the exponential nature of weights,
small diﬀerences in the value of hN in this range results in large variations in kernel weights. For
example, a household whose selection index changes by 50% between two periods is weighted by
0.61, 0.13 and 0.004 for hN =0 .5, 0.24 and 0.15 respectively. To make sure that our conclusions are
robust to values of hN in this range, in the next section we will also report the results for hN =0 .5
as well.
5R e s u l t s
In this section we report our empirical ﬁndings. First, we present the results obtained from tests of
risk-sharing for stockholders, non-stockholders and the whole population. Then we consider several
extensions and alternative tests to examine for the robustness of these results. We conclude by
discussing parameter estimates.
In PSID consumption (food) data is not available in 1988 and 1989, which leaves us with six
16time diﬀerences that can be used in estimation: 84-85, 85-86, 86-87, 90-91, 91-92, 92-93.
Instruments. Our main set includes the following nine variables for the estimation using the
time diﬀerence between t − 1 and t: a constant; age of head at time t, age1it; age of spouse at
time t, age2it; the contemporaneous change in household size, ∆hszit; twice lagged change in log
consumption, ∆ci,t−2; twice lagged change in log wage of husband, ∆w1i,t−2; and the twice lagged
change in log spouse’s wage, ∆w2i,t−2.
This instrument set is used for the PRS condition. Notice that we have not included the ﬁrst lags
of variables which are susceptible to measurement error, such as consumption and wages, because
the resulting correlation with variables in the PRS equation would make them invalid. For the MRS
condition, we use the same instruments as in the PRS condition, with two additions (to increase
the precision of the estimates of preference parameters): we include the dummy for stockholding
status, dit; and we use the levels of household size in t − 1 and t, hszit−1 and hszit, instead of the
change.
For the empirical speciﬁcation of xit, we choose a square and a cubic polynomial of husband’s
age, age2
1it,a g e 3
1it, and the household size, hszit.
5.1 Tests of risk-sharing
Table 2 presents the main result of the paper. We ﬁrst estimate the PRS condition for stockholders
only, using the optimal bandwidth (h∗
N =0 .24). If perfect risk sharing holds, this equation should
adequately describe the marginal utility growth for stockholders and the model speciﬁcation J−test
should not reject the estimated moment condition. However, this is not the case: in column 1, the
PRS condition has a p-value of 0.004, strongly rejecting perfect risk sharing among stockholders.
Next we turn to non-stockholders. As discussed in the introduction, non-stockholders also have
access to informal or non-market insurance mechanisms, and may face diﬀerent (or even fewer
types of) risks than stockholders. Therefore, it is conceivable that they might be able to share risk
eﬀectively among themselves. To investigate this possibility then, we now test for PRS only among
non-stockholders, which is reported in the second column. The p-value of the test is 70 percent,
showing no evidence against perfect risk-sharing among non-stockholders.
To examine if this result is sensitive to the assumed bandwidth for the kernel function, we repeat
the same test with a wider bandwidth: hN =0 .5 (columns 4 and 5). The p-value for stockholders
slightly increases to 0.009, still indicating a rejection at 1% level. The p-value for non-stockholders
falls to 0.421, but is still far away from rejection. Similarly, using a tighter bandwidth of hN =0 .15
(columns 6 and 7) only has a small eﬀect on these results: the p-value for stockholders is 0.025,
and for non-stockholders it rises to 0.66. As noted earlier because of the exponential nature of the
kernel weights, the eﬀective sample size shrinks quickly with a smaller bandwidth, which might be
partly responsible for the slightly higher p-values for the stockholders in this latter case.
17Table 2: Tests of Risk Sharing using the PRS equation only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
h∗
N =0 .24 hN =0 .50 hN =0 .15
Group HN A l l HN H N
Moment Conditions PRS PRS MRS PRS PRS PRS PRS
Test Statistics
χ2 52.1 24.3 54.1 49.8 29.9 45.7 25.3
df 29 29 45 29 29 29 29
p-value 0.004 0.709 0.166 0.009 0.421 0.025 0.66
Notes: H and N denote stockHolders and Non-stockholders respectively. P-value (PRS) refers to the
signiﬁcance level associated with the PRS moment condition df is the degrees of freedom for the moment
conditions in a given column. The instrument set for the PRS equation includes a constant, age of head,
age of spouse, change in household size, consumption growth lagged twice, and husband’s and spouse’s
wage growth lagged twice. The instrument set for MRS adds a dummy indicating stock ownership to
the previous list, and uses the levels of household size instead of its change.
5.2 PRS tests: Robustness
Before looking for interpretations for these ﬁndings, it is important to address several issues re-
garding the robustness of these results. The ﬁrst question is if the model speciﬁcation test could be
rejecting the PRS moment condition because of invalid instruments. One way to check this possi-
bility is to estimate the MRS equation with instruments that were also included in the instrument
set for the PRS equation. This will be informative because under the null hypothesis of perfect
risk sharing, the error term in the PRS equation is ∆ε0it, which also appears in the MRS equation
(compare equations 9 and 11). So, if some instruments are invalid, they are also likely to result in
the rejection of the MRS equation. In Column 3 of Table 2 we estimate the MRS equation using
data on all households in the sample. The J − test has a p-value of 0.166 showing no evidence
against the MRS equation, and consequently, against the validity of the instruments. Moreover, if
instruments were indeed invalid, it is not clear why this would aﬀect the moment conditions of the
stockholders signiﬁcantly while not being revealed in the non-stockholders’ moment conditions.
Second, could these results be explained by the poor ﬁnite sample properties of the kernel-
weighted GMM estimator? For example, if the model speciﬁcation test tends to over-reject in small
samples, it will be more likely to reject the null for stockholders than for non-stockholders (since
the sample size is smaller for the former group). However, note that the eﬀective sample size for the
estimator is NhN. So, for example, the stockholders’ eﬀe c t i v es a m p l es i z ew h e nhN =0 .5 (3178 ×
0.5 = 1589) is close to that of non-stockholders when hN =0 .24 (5763 × 0.24 = 1383). Similarly,
the eﬀective sample size of non-stockholders’ when hN =0 .15 i sc l o s et ot h a to fs t o c k h o l d e r s
18Table 3: Test of Risk-Sharing Using Lead Instruments
h∗
N =0 .24 hN =0 .50
Group HN HN
Moment Condition P R SP R S P R SP R S
Test Statistics
χ2 48.7 33.8 52.2 36.4
df 29 29 29 32
p-value (PRS) 0.012 0.247 0.005 0.162
Notes: The instrument set includes a constant, age of head, age of spouse, change in household size,
change in head’s log wage from t − 3 to t +1 , and from t − 2 to t +1 .
when hN =0 .24. Since the results of PRS tests are the same for all these bandwidth sizes, this
particular concern does not appear to be critical. Furthermore, consistent with this ﬁnding, the
Monte Carlo evidence in Kyriazidou (1997, 2001) suggests that the small sample properties are
quite well-behaved for sample sizes around those considered in this paper.15
Third, is it possible that we fail to reject PRS in non-stockholders’ sample because there is more
unobserved variability (and hence less information) in that sample, whereas the reverse is true in
stockholders’ sample leading to a rejection? This does not seem likely to be the case, because
non-stockholders’ sample is twice as large as that of stockholders (table 1), so everything else equal
speciﬁcation tests should have more power to reject in the former sample. As another reﬂection of
this fact, in the next section we ﬁnd that the estimates obtained from non-stockholders’ sample are
more precise than those from stockholders’ sample. Thus, it is unlikely that less information (or
larger variances) in non-stockholders’ sample accounts for diﬀerences in the PRS test results.
Fourth, as noted by Hayashi et. al. (1996), tests of perfect risk sharing may not have high
power against the alternative of self-insurance if the instrument set only includes lagged values of
variables such as wages and consumption.16 To investigate this possibility, we replace the lagged
wage changes (∆w1i,t−2 and ∆w2i,t−2) with the bracketing wage changes of the head from t − 2 to
t+1and from t−3 to t+1in the main instrument set used before, as suggested by Hayashi et al.
As Table 3 displays, PRS is rejected for stockholders as before, with p-values between 0.005 and
0.012. For the non-stockholders, although the p-value is lower than before (0.162 and 0.247), the
15Another well-known problem is that small sample properties could deteriorate when the number of instruments
is large. To address this possibility, the working paper version (Guvenen (2003, table 4)) reports additional tests of
PRS, where we eliminate several instruments to reduce the degrees of freedom. The results reported there shows that
this has no appreciable eﬀect on the test results.
16This is because even with incomplete markets, the permanent income hypothesis implies that lagged endogenous
variables will be uncorrelated with current forecast errors. If, further, the forecast error can be written as the sum of
an aggregate and an idiosyncratic component, then lagged variables will have zero correlation with the idiosyncratic
component even when markets are incomplete. See Hayashi et al (1996) for further discussion.
19Table 4: Tests of Risk Sharing using the Marginal Utility of Leisure Equation
h∗
N =0 .24 hN =0 .50
Group HNHN
Moment Conditions PRS PRS PRS PRS
Test Statistics
χ2 49.7 28.9 51.7 30.1
df 29 29 29 29
p-value (PRS) 0.009 0.471 0.006 0.409
Notes: The instrument set is the same one as the one used in Table 2.
PRS cannot be rejected at conventional signiﬁcance levels.
A ﬁnal concern discussed earlier is about the use of food expenditures as a measure of con-
sumption. It is possible to test for PRS without relying on consumption data. To develop such a
test note that PRS also imposes structure on the cross-section of marginal utility of leisure growth
through equation (4). After taking logs, diﬀerencing and rearranging this equation (for household
heads that are working in years t and t − 1), we get
ρ2∆l2nt = ∆w1nt + ∆ln(λt) − b0∆xnt − (ρ1 − 1)∆l1nt − ∆ε0nt (16)
The results reported in Table 4 are similar to those found above: using the optimal band-
width, risk-sharing is rejected for stockholders with a p-value of 0.009, but not for non-stockholders
(p − value =0 .471). Increasing hN to 0.50 has little eﬀect as in previous cases.
Before closing this section we compare our ﬁndings to existing work reviewed in the Introduction,
which strongly rejected perfect insurance in the whole population. We repeat our main test of PRS
for the whole population, and append the MRS equation to increase the power of the test. In
column 1, the overidentifying restriction for PRS has a p-value of 0.013 rejecting the null of perfect
risk sharing for the whole population.
To further increase the power of the test, we add a simple wage equation (20)–which expresses
the wage of the head as a function of individual-characteristics–as an additional moment condition
(see appendix C for the description of this equation). This equation acts as a “seemingly unrelated
regression” and is also used to obtain more precise estimates in the next section. In the next column,
we report the results with this wage equation added: the p-value of PRS now goes further down
to 4 × 10−4. Considering a higher bandwidth value of hN =0 .5 makes the rejection even stronger
with p-values never higher than 10−4. Thus, our results are consistent with earlier results indicating
strong rejection of perfect risk sharing for the whole population. In light of these ﬁndings, it seems
that the rejection of PRS in the whole population obtained in the literature is likely to be due to
20Table 5: Tests of Risk Sharing in the Whole Population
(1) (2) (3) (4)
h∗
N =0 .24 hN =0 .5
Group H+N H+N H+N H+N
Moment Conditions MRS & PRS MRS & PRS MRS &PRS MRS & PRS
&W A G E &W A G E
Test Statistics
χ2 102.6 137.67 149.2 196.0
df 74 114 74 114
p-value (Model) 0.016 0.003 0.000 0.000
p-value (PRS) 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.000
N o t e s :T h ei n s t r u m e n ts e ti st h es a m eo n eu s e da si nT a b l e2 . F o rt h ew a g ee q u a t i o n ,( 2 0 ) ,w ee x c l u d ew i f e ’ s
twice lagged wage change, and twice lagged consumption growth, but add the education of head, E1nt to the
instrument set above.
the rejection of PRS not among the non-stockholders, but instead among the stockholders.
5.3 Parameter estimates
All the structural parameters of the model can be identiﬁed by jointly estimating: (1) the MRS
equation, and (2) the PRS condition for either stockholders or non-stockholders. The wage equation
(20) is added as a third moment condition to obtain more precise estimates. Because the PRS
equation is strongly rejected for stockholders, but not for non-stockholders, in Table 6 we report the
estimates of structural parameters obtained by estimating the PRS equation for non-stockholders
only, in addition to the MRS and wage equation estimated for the whole population.
The ﬁrst column presents the parameters obtained when the optimal bandwidth value is used.
First, the curvature of consumption, ρ0, is estimated to be 0.27 and is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero, suggesting logarithmic consumption preferences. In the next column, which reports the
results when the bandwidth is hN =0 .50, the estimate of ρ0 is only slightly higher (0.49) and still
not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. This result is consistent with earlier studies using PSID data
(c.f., Altug and Miller (1990)).
Second, the curvature of male leisure is estimated to be −6.16 and is statistically signiﬁcant
at 1 percent level. The implied elasticity of male labor supply with respect to wages (holding the
marginal utility of wealth constant) is L1it ((1 − L1it)(1− ρ1))
−1 , w h i c hc a ne a s i l yb ed e r i v e df r o m
the ﬁrst order condition for labor choice, equation (4). Given that the average time spent at work is
approximately 2200 hours per year in our sample (see Table 1), assuming 16 hours of discretionary
time per day, we get L1it =0 .37. Then the implied elasticity is 0.08. Similarly, if we take the
estimate of ρ1 = −4.83 from the column 2, the implied elasticity would be 0.10. These values are










N =0 .24 hN =0 .50 hN = ∞
Model Rejected at 5%? No No Yes
Curvature Parameters
ρ0 0.27 0.49 0.99
(0.43) (0.33) (3.63)
ρ1 −6.16 −4.83 −6.26
(1.96) (1.10) (41.54)
ρ2 −24.1 −16.32 −0.87
(31.2) (28.1) (265.8)




0 (age-squared) −0.88 −0.42 −0.01
(2.55) (1.47) (2.47)
b2
0 (age-cubed) −2.50 −1.18 −0.03
(1.24) (0.77) (3.64)
b3
0 (family size) 0.67 0.32 −0.01
(1.05) (0.68) (3.88)
b1
1 (age-squared) −1.16 −0.54 −0.43
(2.65) (1.48) (4.12)
b2
1 (age-cubed) −2.30 −1.12 0.17
(2.63) (1.39) (3.65)
b3
1 (family size) 1.24 0.92 1.54
(2.54) (1.44) (13.64)
Test Statistics
χ2 (Model) 124.3 120.5 149.2
df (Model) 114 114 114
p-value (Model) 0.239 0.320 0.014
p-value (PRS) 0.566 0.762 0.022
Notes: The moment conditions used are the MRS and Wage equations (11 and 20) for the whole
population, and the PRS equation (9) for non-stockholders. The structural parameters are exactly
identiﬁed and the standard error for parameter estimates are in parenthesis.
22within the range found in the previous literature, reported for example in Browning, Hansen and
Heckman (1999, table 3.3). As for the curvature parameters of female leisure, ρ2 and ρ3,w h i l et h e
point estimates are negative, neither one is statistically diﬀerent from zero. The negative signs are
consistent with the estimates of Altug and Miller (1990) and Hayashi et al. (1996).
The estimated coeﬃcients of household characteristics seem reasonable. The coeﬃcients on the
age polynomial are all negative indicating that, everything else held constant, the utility derived
from both sub-utilities decreases with age. The structural coeﬃcient of hszit is positive which
means that an increase in household size (which is mostly due to a new child, since our sample
contains only married couples) increases both subutilities. The implied Frisch elasticity of male





L1it ((1 − L1it)(ρ1 − 1))
−1 . Evaluating this
formula using the estimate of b3
1 =1 .24 from the ﬁrst column, and the average family size of 3.5
from Table 1, yields an elasticity of −0.36. The negative value suggests that a new child reduces
the work hours of the head, most probably in response to the increased home production demand
associated with childrearing.
Finally, the last column reports the parameter estimates when no kernel is used: hN = ∞. First,
notice in the last row that the model is rejected at any signiﬁcance level higher than 1.4%. Second,
while the parameter estimates are not dramatically diﬀerent, the standard errors are substantially
higher in most cases. Similarly, we found that when stockholders’ PRS condition is used (instead
of non-stockholders’) the parameter estimates are erratic, and often have the wrong sign with large
standard errors (available upon request). As noted above, in this case the joint moment conditions
(MRS, PRS and wage equations) are always rejected regardless of kernel bandwidth.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper we found strong evidence against perfect risk-sharing among stockholders, but were
unable to reject it among non-stockholders. Furthermore, risk-sharing in the whole population
is also strongly rejected. Overall, these ﬁndings suggest that the failure of PRS in the whole
population, also found by many previous studies, is likely to be due to the failure of the wealthy to
insure the additional risks they face.
One potential source of risk faced primarily by the wealthy (stockholders) is entrepreneurial
income risk.17 T h el i t e r a t u r eo ﬀers several reasons–based on asymmetric information (agency)
problems–for why entrepreneurial income is diﬃcult to insure (Bitler, Moskowitz and Vissing-
Jorgensen (2005)). Thus, while stockholders may have access to additional insurance opportu-
nities, their income is harder to insure as well.18 In contrast, the main sources of income for
17According to the 1995 Survey of Consumer Finances the fraction of business owners (with a business value above
$10,000) among non-stockholders is only 3 percent.
18Although it is beyond the scope of this paper, in principle it is possible to identify the role of entrepreneurial
23non-stockholders are wages and salaries, which already include several implicit or explicit sources
of insurance (unemployment and disability insurance, long-term contracts, labor hoarding behav-
iour by ﬁrms, etc.) In addition, a number of informal risk sharing mechanisms (e.g., inter-vivos
transfers, charitable donations, and borrowing and lending) further eliminate the risks faced by
most households. Note that many of these insurance opportunities may not be eﬀective in insuring
the potentially large losses experienced by business owners.
A second potential source of additional risk for stockholders could be the stock market itself.
If stockholders face certain trading frictions, such as information aquisition costs (for each stock
they trade), transactions costs, and short-selling constraints, this could easily prevent them from
forming optimal portfolios. As a result, if each stockholder only holds a few stocks instead of
aw e l l - d i v e r s i ﬁed optimal portfolio, there is no reason to expect that they will be equating their
marginal utility growth since each investor is exposed to substantial idiosyncratic uncertainty of the
stocks in their portfolio. Indeed, empirical studies have shown that, especially before 1990’s, more
than 1/3 of stockholders were seriously under-diversiﬁed, holding a portfolio containing 5 stocks or
less (see Curcuru et al. (2005) for a detailed review of these empirical facts). However, during the
1990’s, investors increasingly switched from holding individual stocks to mutual funds, improving
diversiﬁcation (although still far from perfect). Although it would be interesting to explore if this
trend has improved risk-sharing among stockholders, unfortunately PSID does not contain detailed
portfolio information to conduct such an analysis.
Accounting for diﬀerences in idiosyncratic risks between the wealthy and the poor could poten-
tially help explain several diﬀerences in behavior between these groups, such as why the wealthy
have a higher savings rate, and why they demand such a high return for holding risky assets. Over-
all these results underscore the need to focus on risks faced by wealthy households as important
sources of market incompleteness. Further work is needed to pinpoint the exact types of risks that
are uninsurable for wealthy households.
AA p p e n d i x : T h e D a t a
Starting with the PSID family ﬁles covering 1982-93 waves, we use the following sample selection criteria to select
our main sample. Speciﬁcally, we include household-years in t and (t − 1) in estimation if the head of the family:
(i) is in the study for at least four consecutive years (t − 3,...,t) including 1984 or 1989,
(ii) is married to the same spouse at least in the last two years (t − 1,t) of the same period,
(iii) has a positive labor income at least in the last two years (t − 1,t) of the same period.
These criteria produced a sample of 2350 households who were in the study between 1984 and 1993, not necessarily
for all years. We further eliminate a household-year if:
risk for stockholders. In particular, looking at stockholders only, one can test the PRS separately for those who own
private businesses and those who do not. If risk-sharing is rejected for the former group but not for the latter, then
this would suggest entrepreneurial risk as an important source of market incompleteness. However, entrepreneurship
introduces another selection equation which must be dealt with as well. So, we leave this question for future research.
24(iv) annual family food consumption expenditure is less than $150,
(v) the head’s education variable is missing for the last two years (t − 1,t) of this period,
(vi) if the head’s or spouse’s reported annual labor hours exceeded 4860 hours,
(vii) if the head or spouse had positive annual labor hours but zero annual labor income, or vice versa.
Conditions (iv)-(vii) are similar to those used to eliminate irregular observations in the literature (c.f., Altug and
Miller (1990), Hayashi et al (1996))
(viii) Finally, if a household changed its stockholding status from 1984 to 1989, we eliminate that observation from
estimation between these two dates.
An important concern is coding errors. To eliminate potential outliers, we ﬁrst isolated observations on total
consumption, head’s wage and spouse’s wage, if the following bound was violated: E (xt)−2std(xt) ≤ xt ≤ 2E (xt)+
2std(xt),w h e r ext denotes the variable. There were a total of 46 observations violating this bound for at least one
of the three variables. Upon closer inspection of the time-series of these variables, we eliminated 41 observations
which had small standard deviations and the outlier was signiﬁcantly away from the sample average. These criteria
produced a total of 8941 of observations. The breakdown for each moment condition is as follows: 1292 observations
for the 83−84 moments, 1289 for 84−85, 1302 for 85−86, 1761 for 89−90,1 7 0 9f o r90 −91, and 1588 for 91 −92.
Wages: The average hourly labor earnings (wages) of head and spouse reported in PSID and adopted in this paper
are calculated from the sum of the following types of income and total annual hours: V19127, Labor Part of Farm
Income; V19128, Labor Part of Business Income; V19129, Salary Income; V19131, Bonuses, Overtime, Commissions;
V19132, Income from Professional Practice or Trade; V19133, Labor Part of Market Gardening Income; V19134,
Labor Part of Roomers and Boarders Income.
Stockholding:T h ed e ﬁnition of stockholding adopted in this paper includes ownership of shares of stock in publicly
held corporations, mutual funds, investment trusts, including stocks in IRA’s. This deﬁnition corresponds to PSID
variables V10912 for 1984 and V17325 for 1989. All households who indicate they do not own any of these assets are
considered non-stockholders that year.
This deﬁnition of stockholding does not include indirect ownership of stocks through pension funds. Notice that,
ﬁrst, indirect holding was more modest during the 1980’s and has become much more popular in the 1990’s (see
Investment Company Institute (2002) for direct and indirect stock ownership rates). And second, pension funds
impose several restrictions on the use of funds, which is not consistent with our null hypothesis that stockholders can
optimally use their assets to insure against shocks to their budget sets.
PSID collects stock ownership data every ﬁve years (from 1984 on) whereas for our empirical work we need this
information for every year. We identify a household as a stockholder (alternatively, non-stockholder) in every year
between 1984 to 1989, if he is present in the sample in both years as a stockholder (non-stockholder). Second, if a
household switches between these two groups from 1984 to 1989, we eliminate those observations from the sample
between these two dates since we are not able to determine when the switch exactly happens. Clearly, this step
creates another selection bias, which the econometric method is able to handle as explained in the text. Finally, for
years after 1989 we take the status of a household as it is given in 1989. This identiﬁcation scheme is clearly not
perfect, but notice that the estimation method asymptotically assigns zero weight to an observation if the probability
of being a stockholder changes (∆θyit 6=0 ) . Thus, a household who moves in, or who moves out of the stock market
between 1984 and 1989 will receive a small (and asymptotically zero) weight in estimation since this move is likely
to be accompanied by a change in the selection index.
B Appendix: Estimation
We describe the procedure for the estimation of the PRS condition (9) for the stockholders; the case for the MRS
equation and the wage equation (eq (20) described in the next appendix) are analogous. First, in order to construct
f(α,i),f o re a c hy e a rt we pick (r × 1) dimensional vectors of instruments Zit satisfying
E [Zit∆ε0it|∆θyit =0 ,d itdi,t−1 =1 ]=0 , (17)
Denote these moment conditions for year t by ft (α,i). From the moment conditions (9) and (11), it is clear
that for testing PRS and identifying the structural parameters of the model, one only needs data in two consecutive
periods. Thus we reduce the panel data estimation into cross-section by forming the following T
∗r dimensional vector
where T
∗ is our panel length:
f(α,i)=( f1 (α,i),...,fT∗ (α,i))
0 . (18)
25T
∗ =6 , and r =3 9for the PRS equation (r =5 1for the MRS equation, and 47 for the wage equation). We






itf(α,i), which is then used to construct the GMM objective function:







Under certain regularity conditions outlined in Kyriazidou (2001), this estimator is consistent and asymptotically
normal with
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NhN convergence rate. In the absence of a formula for the optimal weighting matrix, we will choose
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which is optimal in the standard GMM case.
Unlike in the standard GMM case, the J−test for the kernel-weighted estimator is non-central chi-squared







n=1 e ψNfj(αj,n). Even though this quantity can be estimated in principle, this is very diﬃcult in
practice (see Bierens (1987) for a detailed discussion). The Monte Carlo experiments in Kyriazidou (1997, 2001)
suggest that this bias is small in general, suggesting that the NCP is also likely to be small. We use the central
chi-squared distribution to perform the hypothesis tests. In the worst case, this will bias the results towards rejection
if the NCP is large (see Davidson and MacKinnon 1993, pp. 412-414).





K (υ)dυ =1 , and we consider symmetric kernels:
U
υK(υ)dυ =0 . Moreover the smoothness of the kernel aﬀects
the asymptotic convergence rate which imposes restrictions on the empirical choice of the function K (·). We work
with a Gaussian kernel which satisﬁes these conditions. Because asymptotically optimal kernel functions perform
only slightly better even in the limit, normal density is a reasonable choice in practice.
The choice of optimal bandwidth.–The ﬁr s ts t e pi st oc h o o s ehN. As is usually the case with semiparametric
methods, asymptotically optimal methods for selecting the bandwidth provide little guidance for practical implemen-
tation with a ﬁxed sample size. However, observing that the estimated weighting function, ψ
N
it, h a sas t r u c t u r es i m i l a r
to a kernel density estimator, a sensible approach is to select hN as the cross-validated value for the estimation of
the density of the selection index, θyit. Hence, the bandwidth is chosen by minimizing the mean integrated squared
error of the kernel density estimator.
C A p p e n d i x :T h eW a g eE q u a t i o n
Provided that the labor market is competitive, the wage rate of a given household head can be written as follows:
W1it = δw (Xwit)Wt, (19)
where δw(Xwit) is an eﬃciency index function; Xwit is a vector of household characteristics possibly containing some
elements not included in Xit,a n dWt is the market wage rate. This wage equation is used in some speciﬁcations
(described in the text) to increase the asymptotic eﬃciency of the estimator through the correlation of the error
terms. We assume that Xwit =( xwit,ε wit), where xwit and εwit denote the observable and unobservable components.
Moreover similarly to the speciﬁcation in (7) we assume that δw(Xwit)=e x p( bwxwit +εwit). After taking logs, ﬁrst
diﬀerencing and rearranging we have:
∆w1it = ∆ln(Wt)+bw∆xwit + ∆εwit. (20)






where Ent is the completed education of
the individual.
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